If the images are located on the shared sd-card section you can directly access and copy them using a connected PC and set USB mode to files/MTP mode. If the images are located in the app-private data folder you don't have direct access to them But Android VMOS app contains the entry android:allowBackup="true" in it's manifest so even on unrooted devices you can get all data used by the app. Connect your Android phone to a PC with installed AndroidSDK or ADB minimal, enable Developer menu and Android Debug Bridge (adb) on the phone and execute the command: adb backup com.vmos.web It will create a file named backup.ab that contains all the files from app-private data folder that you can't access directly from a PC. If you want to copy VMOS to a different phone, enable adb in it and restore VMOS including data using adb restore backup.apk You can also view/modify the created backup.ab file by converting it to a TAR archive (and back to an .ab file) using https://github.com/nelenkov/android-backup-extractor .

As noted in the comments there are several applications for the term. This answer focuses on the term as it relates to a compliance audit. In the context of an audit, a golden image refers to an original image that is used when creating servers in your environment. Based on the reference below: The term itself comes from the old practice of recordable CDs being manufactured with gold film. Hence the gold colored CD actually being the source The NIST Risk Management Framework (800-53) refer to golden images as baseline configurations. In 800-53 CM-2: Baseline configurations serve as a basis for future builds, releases, or changes to systems and include security and privacy control implementations, operational procedures, information about system components, network topology, and logical placement of components in the system architecture. Maintaining baseline configurations requires creating new baselines as organizational systems change over time. Baseline configurations of systems reflect the current enterprise architecture. An example that an auditor would be looking for is a hardened image of a specific OS version that is used to build out other servers in your environment. It demonstrates that your base-build a) has been reviewed, b) has not been altered, and that c) its use is repeatable. References https://softwareengineering.stackexchange.com/questions/62472/what-is-the-genesis-of-the-golden-master-term https://www.techopedia.com/definition/29456/golden-image https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/risk-management/sp800-53-controls/release-search#/control?version=5.1&number=CM-2

Adding on my comment, I can only share my personal experience and what worked with our clients in the past. You have to have a Diagram with an at least high overview on how the services will work: Example Client>Internet>Load Balancer>EC2>Web Server>Database and etc. There are many programs that you can use for that, example draw.io or Lucidchart(I prefer Lucidchart for the UI and it has a free option). Some price ranges and estimations, the simplest way I used was make an estimation in Azure Calculator and export it in CSV. Make some highlights that you think are important to know and any additional calculations based on your services(for example what they pay you for XX of time work for 1 year). Make a few estimations. What we did as an estimation thats for the best price, but does not ensure the best performance(basically based on the app and load the Minimum Requirements). And an estimation for best performance, where the price is high but you know thats going to hold a lot of load. These are 3 major components IMO. We also used a detailed list of the services we provided and "plan" type which you can use. For example plan 1 includes 1 service, plan 2 includes 5 and etc(basically like a subscription). I am explaining it like Im the one providing you a service and letting you know what you will get. In your specific case, you can ask all the above => Prices for each component and Server size, disk size and etc. Where all the connection goes, the list of VM/Servers and their specifications. What is used for what and so on. In a few words, the best practices is to know what you are paying for and how it is being used. In what details you want that is fully up to you. And you as a client should have the full right to do that. If you wanted from me for example to see how much traffic you get, I would give you that with no problems.

As long as the host is not capable of executing the malware you should be fine storing the samples on the host disk. Make sure that you don't have something like Wine or Crossover running on the Ubuntu host otherwise it might be possible to accidentally execute the malware. Chances are that the payload would fail, but the risk is still there. Moving the malware samples to an external drive and only inserting it while you are analyzing the samples would mean that you are lowering the likelihood of accidental execution. tl;dr: If you are only using the host for malware analysis I would keep it on disk. If you are using it for other things as well, keep them on an external drive and only insert it while you are interacting with the malware.

The answer is on both. And on the network level too. I read "from outside the Network" as that you do not have sufficient control over who connects to your VM. So, your VM must have sufficient access control. Sufficient is, of course, not a precise term, because it depends on the network lay-out, how 'trusted' those who access can be (for example: did they authenticate before getting access to the network?), what "outside the network" precisely means et cetera. Your VM may be used as a stepping stone towards the rest of your network, especially if you can RDP to it. That means that at least the host needs some measures to prevent such access. Again, this should be sufficient measures, with the same side notes as above. It must be clear, that, if you allow connections from a network outside your control, you will not get away with installing security measures in one place only.

The initial question asks "Will the VM be infected?", which is asking to predict the future, which is not possible for anyone on this site to do. So instead, I will answer "Can the VM be infected?" The reason why you read a lot about VM isolation is because the VM is, in essence, just a process on the host machine, similar to Chrome, VLC or any game you may be playing. A VM process just happens to be a lot more complex, but in essence, the VM is less privileged than your host's operating system. It would be nonsensical if the VM could somehow "overrule" the host's operating system. But this paints a clear picture: The host OS is more privileged than the guest OS. If malware infects the host, then an attacker may be able to run commands with elevated privileges (root on UNIX systems, SYSTEM on Windows, etc.), or even run with kernel privileges. If that is the case, then the VM can be modified and infected at will by an attacker. After all, the VM is just a process, running in the same compromised environment.

What benefits does the TPM bring to the end-user, and are these justifiably enough to make the OS not even function if there isn't one present? OS can function perfectly fine without TPM. What you are seeing is a design choice, not a functional requirement. TPM allows the vendor to make sure its OS will not run on non-approved devices. It can block non-approved kernel modules from being executed. It can charge third party vendors for allowing their hardware or software to be loaded. It's not all on the interest of the user, but on the vendor. But TPM can help the user too. TPM can protect the full disk encryption key, so it's very difficult (or even impossible) to execute an https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack . TPM attestation will detect a modified bootloader, and Secure Boot will (in theory) not let it load. There are some caveats, some implementation issues and bypasses, so TPM isn't viewed as perfect solution, but another defense layer.

Technically, having a separate hard disk with a fresh installation of Windows 10 is the way to go. Format and reinstall every time you start a new project or suspect something fishy. This is the only way to make 100% sure you will be OK. Make sure this hard disk is the only one installed (connected). Use a non-spinning disk for faster performance. some people make bootable stick with scripts to automatically format a drive and install an image, which will save you time. Virtual machines do the job, but lack of performance and the possibility of infecting parts of the hard disk outside of the VM is there. If what you doing is extremely sensitive, take all precautions!

An attacker that grabs a disk image can take a lot of things: credentials source code database data configuration files log files application files passwords It can make a copy of the disk image, start it somewhere, and have a deep understanding of everything inside, and that simplifies the process of finding vulnerabilities. Extensive data leakage would be the result, and it's as bad as it can get.

If you don't control the hardware, you don't control anything running inside it. Even if you have a virtualized environment inside another, it won't protect anything. The host can dump the memory of the guest, and dump whatever virtual environment you have inside. Your protection is the reputation of your provider. Find a provider that hosts private information and have a large consumer base, and that's it. They have pretty stringent rules on what their staff can do, and will not damage their reputation for snooping on your code.

Virtual Block Devices Usually, you don't partition your HDD to give it to a VM. Usually, a "virtual disk", which is just a file on your HDD, is used. This is sometimes called a "Virtual Block Device", and has many advantages. For example, disks can be re-sized my simply making the file larger, or backed up by copying a file. And since the files are "sparse files", you can create larger virtual disks for multiple machines without needing as much storage space. So what happens when you delete the VM? Well, either the file remains on your disk, so you can create a new VM and have that use the same disk, or you can delete the file. The consequences are identical to that of deleting a normal file. Dedicated Partitions for VMs As you asked in your question, it's possible to use a physical partition for a virtual machine. If you delete your VM, then the partition remains. In all likelihood, it's probably a bootable partition as well, so you could in theory boot into it. This process was sometimes used on MacOS, with Windows installed as secondary OS. You could either boot into Windows, or you could boot into MacOS and boot Windows as a VM. In order to delete the disk, you have to either re-format it or overwrite it. Re-formatting is much faster, but leaves the VM data there, so parts of it could likely be recovered again. Overwriting it is more safe, but also takes much longer, depending on the size of the disk.

As a general rule, you want to enable as few "sharing" features, and as little hardware access, as you can get away with. For gaming in particular you'll need to enable some (unless everything you want to run will be fine with software-only graphics), but you can try to keep it minimal. The more isolated the VM is from the host, the better. Of course, "security" isn't a binary state, and 100% security is impossible on any computer that is actually useful, but you can make it safe enough. Never mind airplane mode; if you want to keep the Windows VM off the Internet, just don't give the VM a network interface. (Also, Win7 - which came out 12 years ago and is obsolete - doesn't actually have an "airplane mode" feature except maybe if you have a cellular radio installed.) The question of whether you "need" antivirus is a bit of an odd one; if AV is ever doing anything useful then you have probably already screwed up multiple times already, and you should never count on it to save you. It might be worth having installed in Windows anyhow - free options like Defender should be fine - but bear in mind that without regular signature updates it'll be even less likely to save you than usual. On the other hand, if you're only installing legitimate software from legitimate install media (i.e. not from pirate sites, which are full of malware), and aren't running anything downloaded from the Internet, then you really don't need AV at all... how do you imagine malware would even get into the system? With that said, if you're downloading warez, or even just unofficial patches or mods, then AV might be worth having. Note that, for gaming in particular, you might not get full speed from the graphics card when running in a VM. Though if the games are old enough perhaps this doesn't matter. Make sure you use VM software that supports virtualizing the graphics card at all, though! Note that this technically does open a potential attack vector for guest-to-host (through the graphics card) and video drivers are often kind of bad at security, but it's probably fine. Malware that exploits a video driver might use it for local elevation of privilege; it's very unlikely to use to to try and pivot an attack off the VRAM to exploit a host machine running a different OS. You should be able to expose specific USB devices (so, the DVD drive in this case) directly to the VM guest. In that way, you won't have to share any folders between the Ubuntu and Windows file systems. This will also solve the thing where lots of old games have copy protection that tries to prevent you running them from an ISO or similar, and want a real disk drive. If you're not putting any downloaded files (or at least, none downloaded from anywhere sketchier than GOG) on the VM, and you're not connecting it to the Internet, the odds are very good it won't get infected with anything and therefore it won't pose any threat to the Ubuntu host. However, if you don't share any network connections or file system directories or so on, then the odds are very good that any malware on the VM wouldn't be able to attack the host anyhow (actually, the odds of that are already pretty good; most Windows malware has no idea how to attack Linux... but better if it doesn't even have a chance).

Although I don't have too much experience in setting up a lot of vulnerable servers, "secure" might be a bit vague depending on how you set up your router. Correct me if needed as well. I would like to have internet connection inside Kali. Usually I would use NAT, but if I also have another connection to vulnerable machines using Internal network, is it secure? From what I read up on the difference between Bridged and Internal, they're not too different except internal is safer to use than bridged. From what I've read on the VirtualBox manual: In bridged networking mode, all traffic goes through a physical interface of the host system. It is therefore possible to attach a packet sniffer such as Wireshark to the host interface and log all traffic that goes over it. If, for any reason, you prefer two or more VMs on the same machine to communicate privately, hiding their data from both the host system and the user, bridged networking therefore is not an option. Source: https://www.virtualbox.org/manual/ch06.html#network_internal Bridged From my point of understanding, if you have 2 VMs set up - 1 vulnerable, 1 Kali, Bridged connection will typically make the connection between those 2 VMs a lot easier due to both being hosted on the same subnet, meaning that if you have an external computer/laptop that connects it to the same router, they can see some of the services/ports that are opened from the IP address of your host computer (That is, if the ports are port-fowarded). The only thing I would worry about here is if there is a service in an open port that you opened and someone connected to your Wifi (or you setup a VPN client/server on your host computer and shared a client packet somewhere), where he/she exploits an zero-day guest-to-host exploit and take control of your host computer, which is extremely unlikely, but possible. Internal Internal works the same way, as bridged, however, the only source of communication it has is with the other VM that is set up, where neither VM or the host can communicate with each other. Overall, internal is a lot more secure if you only want the VMs to interact with each other. Bridged is more towards if you want any other device to interact with the host & the VMs.

The current state of Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF, SRDBS, etc. on most platforms, with all patches applied and default mitigations enabled, is that attacks across security boundaries (e.g. cross-core, cross-VM, cross-process) are either impossible or highly impractical. On virtualised hosts, an up-to-date virtualisation platform (e.g. ESXi, Xen) should apply strong mitigations to cross-VM attacks as long as CPU microcode updates have been performed. When it comes to checking the state of these issues on a host, this sentence is really the crux of it: However, protecting against known implementations of the exploits might not necessarily mean I am fully protected. Your VPS provider appears to be running RedHat's own detection script. This is probably fine, but I can't find a public copy of that script, and RedHat require a subscription to download it. As such, it may just be checking for kernel patches. I would recommend asking your hosting provider to run https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker , which checks the status of the CPU in a platform-agnostic way, and looks for OS patches and mitigations. The methods are https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/blob/master/FAQ.md#how-does-this-script-work . Having good results from both the RedHat script and the open source script is about as much assurance as you could hope for. More generally speaking, you should be mostly protected against known CPU side-channel attacks on an up-to-date version of RedHat. The OS will apply mitigations by default and the VPS provider would have to turn them off to leave you vulnerable - something that's not in their interests to do as a virtualised hosting provider. An attacker who executes untrusted code in the context of a process may still be able to exploit some of these attacks, to varying degrees, but they will generally only be able to recover information from that process. The microcode updates offer some protection against cross-core attacks, and the OS patches mitigate the cross-process side of the vulnerability by being careful to flush caches during context switches across security boundaries. In a server environment there are few (if any) cases where untrusted code executes in the same process as trusted code, and if an attacker can gain unrestricted arbitrary code execution in the context of a process on the server they aren't likely to bother with a side-channel attack. The main scenario that people worry about with Meltdown and Spectre, outside of the VPS space, is browsers, since you have multiple documents from different origins running untrusted code (e.g. JavaScript) alongside each other, often in the same process. If an attacker can exploit a side-channel attack from JavaScript (which is entirely possible, and has been done) they can use it to get access to process memory. If multiple documents from different origins are loaded into that same execution context, they can access resources from those other documents and violate the same-origin policy (SOP). This is why https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/255886/does-enabling-sharedarraybuffers-via-service-worker-headers-create-spectre-vulne - it is highly useful as a primitive for exploiting these issues, so browsers require that any resource that wants access to that primitive must be isolated in its own process. All in all, I wouldn't worry too much. Your average attackers don't tend to use this stuff, and even the more advanced ones (which you generally shouldn't worry about unless you're an MSP, NGO, CNI, TLA, gas & oil company, or global comms provider) don't bother unless there's a major reason to. There are only a few odd scenarios where side-channel attacks like this are relevant against a server instead of a client browser. The TL;DR - try to ensure that patches are applied, but don't focus time and attention on this stuff to the detriment of more likely attack vectors such as outdated packages, webapp bugs, config issues, information exposure, poor quality firewall rules, etc.

I had the same issue when i was trying with Hydra v9.1. in 2021.3 Kali. It seems there is a bug in new kali versions with hydra because no traffic is sent. I was testing with an old version Hydra v8.6 (2017) in kali and the same hydra command is working fine. Hydra/Kali should be reviewed in the new kali versions.

The OS patch doesn't remove the CPU side-channel vulnerability. It adds mitigations to the OS kernel to avoid sensitive data being leaked in the processor cache in a way that can be abused by Meltdown and Spectre. The updates protect the victim, rather than removing a capability from an attacker. As such, it doesn't matter what OS version an attacker on an adjacent VM is using. CPU microcode updates make it more difficult to exploit these vulnerabilities. You need both the microcode update and OS update to remain acceptably secure against this type of attack. In addition, some standard libraries (e.g. MSVCRT) have Spectre-mitigated versions that offer additional protection against cache side-channel attacks, although you need to recompile applications with this library for it to be effective. This isn't mandatory if you already have the microcode and OS patches installed - it's more of a defence in depth measure.

The answer is "it depends". Your computer has a lot of processors in it. I don't mean CPU cores, I mean physically distinct processors. Many of these are microprocessors or microcontrollers built into the CPU itself, the chipset, the motherboard, the storage devices, RAID controllers, USB controllers, the peripherals (GPU, NIC, mouse, keyboard), the display itself, the TPM, and even your typical "gamer" components with RGB LEDs or onboard displays, like RGB RAM or AIO watercoolers. Many of these can be reprogrammed at runtime via firmware updates, without needing a reboot. How difficult it is to implement such a thing in practice is extremely variable. What kind of capabilities you might attain from compromising these devices is also extremely variable - flashing malicious firmware onto your mouse offers very different capabilities to flashing malicious firmware onto your SSD. Some devices will allow you to write configuration variables that are non-volatile. These values are not executable code, but they can often be abused to store data outside the view of EDR and forensics tools. This was popularised using UEFI configuration variables, and this is now a detected technique in most AV/EDR solutions. Many of these update and configuration interfaces require at least administrative access in order to communicate with them. Some of them require code running in ring 0 (i.e. privileged code) to access things like MSRs and SMBus. However, many drivers for these types of devices expose the interfaces to usermode applications, allowing you to abuse the legitimate config and update tools for low-level access to the hardware device. Other drivers are even worse, and provide far too much access. The "asmmap64.sys" driver from Asus is a well known example of this, because it lets you access all of kernel memory, all the IO ports, and both read and write MSRs. These are often referred to as "rweverything drivers", after the RWEverything developer tool that has a similar purpose. In practice, abusing these devices for offensive capabilities is almost exclusively restricted to targeted attacks. They are generally only put together by highly capable adversaries like nation states. The cost and engineering work required is too great for the reward in the case of the average criminal, and it's almost impossible to build a single payload that'll work across a wide range of targets. Overwriting the UEFI flash itself with a modified update should not work. The updates are digitally signed and verified during an update, and the platform firmware (device ROM) checks them. It also validates the integrity and authenticity of each piece of the UEFI boot chain during startup, before any user code runs. Breaking into Intel CSME and System Management Mode (SMM) is much more complicated, but there have been vulnerabilities in the past that made it potentially feasible. CVE-2019-0090 is a bug in the way that the IOMMU (think "firewall for DMA") is configured during the initial bringup of the MISA (Minute IA System Agent). Normally, this IOMMU prevents devices from making DMA requests into the SMM SRAM, effectively isolating that memory from even privileged code in the kernel. However, during bringup the SRAM page directory is initialised first, before enabling the IOMMU. This means that any device that is capable of DMA'ing into that SRAM (not to be confused with main system memory) can take advantage of that small window of opportunity to modify the execution flow of the SMM and take over it. While the issue only normally occurs in early boot, it also happens when the CSME comes out of sleep mode, which opens up the opportunity to exploit it at runtime. Doing so, however, would certainly require privileged code execution (ring 0), and again this is largely limited to targeted attacks by nation states due to the extreme complexity and cost of developing such capabilites.

What is Vagrant and Docker?In general, Docker and Vagrant are referring simply to a different degree of virtualization, Docker is a means of virtualization at Linux nucleus (not only Linux, but I don't want to say how it's going on in the mama and windows itself), Vagrant, as a complete virtualization, it's not like that's what Linux thinks.In fact, it's a little different: Docker actually provides the above-mentioned virtualization, and Vagrant is simply the manager of the virtualization funds, and the above-mentioned full-virtualization range actually belongs to the VirtualBox managed by Vagrant. Vagrant has the concept of a provider (the broker of virtualization) and Vagrant can manage both VirtualBox and Docker.Why do you have to do this?You don't point out what exactly the objectives are, so you're gonna have to write what kind of problems this solves and what problems. adopted decide on a tool.Virtualization as such has many nice bonuses, including:Simple and easy limitation of resource processesResource isolationThe ability to deliver is not an annex as such, but a complete solution that is not necessary Establish and build♪ Start.Indirect - repeatability of processesIt's very good in terms of infrastructure, because it allows us to move from the model. broken. to model broken.which is much easier to automate and save the flow of resources.In terms of development, there are two key advantages that can change the development paradigm:The collection of an application inside the virtual machine turns the situation out of my car working in this virtual car. The engineer, who should deploy the application, getting it in a virtual machine, knows that only the launch of the image is required, spends ninety-seven percent of the time the launch errors.The use of virtual machines enables the developer to fully simulate the infrastructure in which the project will be deployed, which again reduces the costs with the known problem of my car, and keeps a few versions of the software for different projects (if project A uses PHP 5.3, and project B uses PHP 7.0, instead of juggling versions in the working car, the developer can keep them in separate isolated machines).In this case, of course, the second point is interesting.And Vagrant + VirtualBox, and Docker allows it to be implemented, so there is no fundamental difference, so it makes sense simply to describe the concepts of both instruments.VirtualBox is in itself just a virtual machine manager who lets them out. It's just, it's taking the image of the system's files, emulating the processor, operating memory, hard drive, a virtual machine looking for a bottle of network on a virtual disk, and the car's starting to start like it's real.Vagrant is the manager of virtualization funds, and it can actually launch not only VirtualBox, but also Docker. Specifically in this Vagrant section, it is possible to automate a virtual machine (or virtual machines) VirtualBox from a pure operating system, using the propeller to initiate the car with shell scrupt or configuration manager.Docker himself provides exactly the same virtualization function, but very different in terms of concept. It uses the following function for its purposes:Copy-On-Write's system of layers for the file system. The final file system is collected from several layers, so the images can divide the lower layers, and each virtual machine uses its own layer (the uppers of the compound), so the machines can use a common base that cannot be copied for the start of the car.Linux nucleus (although it is difficult to say how it is organized in Mac/Windows)This allows cars to be treated as expendable and re-established hundreds of times per second (this is a very rapid process compared to a full virtual car). As a result, Docker ' s philosophy has evolved, which adopts the process-per-container rule (one on the container) and instead of the distribution of virut machines, Docker ' s concept involves the distribution of applications, each of which has a virtual isolation machine.Virtualization inside is almost the same as the conventional virtual machine: a root process that raises all others is under way. The Vagrant-VirtualBox samples usually use the usual init, Docker-like app, so it appears that the Vagrant-Virtualbox virtual machine has an OS manager monitoring everything and Docker-like is nothing but the final application.Therefore, using Docker ' s infrastructure, the key difference is that Vagrant+Virtualbox is usually used to raise one car with everything in the world, and in the case of Docker will be lifted by container for each service (redis, database, line services, etc.).Thus, Virtualbox + Vagrant and Docker are distinguished mainly by a concept that does not have a functional difference. Nevertheless, it cannot be noted that the communichi for each instrument is more developed in the direction in which the instrument itself is used: using Docker, you can use commonly available isolated machines with one process in each car and configuration through variable environments, using Vagrant, you have access to machines that are configurationd through a manager ' s configuration (chef, puppet, saltstackll) or simply,Is there a difference?In my comments on the question, I have taken the position of the no-criminal difference between them, and I intend to keep it.That the Vagrant-up-VirtualBox that Docker actually provides the same function:Virtual car with one root process (in short, so all cars work)Distributed images of these virtual machinesPossibility of a virtual car to host portsAbility of hosting directors in a virtual machineInternal virtual machine network capacityPossibilities of launch/deposition of virtual machinesPossibility of maintaining, unloading and downloading a virtual machineLimitation of a virtual resource machineSo, in fact, there's no functional difference between what you're building your infrastructure, no, you can transfer the vagrantagrant exactly to the philosophy of "one trial on the car" or put everything in the world in one docker-container. However, Docker has a number of advantages that do not affect the performance of virtualization itself, which simply make its use more convenient and cost-effective (and that have shaped its philosophy):Lack of full virtualization costsCOW-system of layers that saves space when using multiple machines with a common ancestorAlmost instantaneous launch by not initializing the system (loading the nucleus, mounting the discs and the whole incredible operating park that occurs when the machine is activated) and the container only remains to launch the binary specified for it by the entry point.Because of this life cycle of the container (in the developer ' s car) is generally much shorter than the virtual car (and, bonosom, it is possible to cancel the database with almost one team).The Docker treatment may be a little more complex, but the overhead costs of the service coupling are declining, and the end-use exports as a virtual machine may be less labour-intensive than in the case of Vagrant + VirtualBox. Nevertheless, vagrant I would not write off the accounts because until the world went to container technology in its entirety, it's closer to re-establishing a whole circle (one car with all the inside) and, in addition, no one forbids using it in the Docker connection.

There will be a very good sharing of resources between guest LOs. I have a host where, at 4 CPU and 24 kernels, about 30 guests from 2-4 vCPU each. Removal on these guests is copier, interest units work normally, high responsiveness. Typical multitasking like she is.

Adapter=) public class SomeAdapter extends BaseAdapter { LayoutInflater layoutInflater; ArrayList<SomeClass> myList; private class ViewHolder{ TextView tv1; ImageView iv1; } public SomeAdapter(Context mCon, ArrayList<SomeClass> list){ this.myList = list; layoutInflater = LayoutInflater.from(mCon); this.context = mCon; } @Override public int getCount() { return myList.size(); } @Override public ProfileEntry getItem(int position) { return myList.get(position); } @Override public long getItemId(int position) { return position; } @Override public View getView(int position, View convertView, ViewGroup parent) { ViewHolder holder = null; if (convertView == null){ holder = new ViewHolder(); convertView = layoutInflater.inflate(R.layout.row_profile,null); //находим элементы в разметке, но не меняем их holder.tv1 = (TextView)convertView.findViewById(R.id.tv_profileRow1); holder.iv1 = (ImageView) convertView.findViewById(R.id.iv_profileRow1); convertView.setTag(holder); } else { holder = (ViewHolder)convertView.getTag(); } //тут назначаем свойства разметке в зависимости от данных if (myList.get(position).getSomeMethod().equals("Что-то")){ // прописываем какой-то текст holder.tv1.setText("Укажите город"); //устанавливаем картинку int picId = context.getResources().getIdentifier(myList.get(position).getImage(),"drawable",context.getPackageName()); holder.iv1.setImageResource(picId); }else{ holder.tv1.setText(myList.get(position).getAnotherMethod()); int picId = context.getResources().getIdentifier(myList.get(position).getImage(),"drawable",context.getPackageName()); holder.iv1.setImageResource(picId); }