You've actually got two questions there: Are there security risks to running 32-bit applications on Windows 10? None worth worrying about. There are some minor risks such as the 32-bit address space limiting the amount of address randomization possible, but they'd only be an issue if you're under attack from a three-letter agency or the like. Are there security risks to following the quoted instructions? Very much so. What those instructions have you do is install a web server, but they don't do anything to secure it. They also don't have anything to do with running 32-bit applications -- Windows 10 supports 32-bit applications by default.

All the actions you've said can't be defended. But even if it were possible, we could use the trafif (sniffers) analyzers, which could easily look at any code. For example, Charles or wireshark♪PS. It must be understood that any html,css,js that a client receives cannot be protected from search, that is, it must be transmitted online and performed by the client, which means that it can be viewed not only by the JS movement but also by the person:DPPS. but to protect the code(js) - oxidators may be used either: JSmin, Closure compiler, YUI Compressor. It is not possible to protect css and html (although it may be minimised, of course, but it's two seconds of any IDE that's a readable species.)

Put your properties down. Password type string https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/a65txexh.aspx and properties IsPasswordSet type bool (initial value) false) You'll have to put it in user scope, not in application scope!Now you can use a code like this:if (!Properties.Settings.Default.IsPasswordSet) { Console.WriteLine("Set password: "); Properties.Settings.Default.Password = Console.ReadLine(); Properties.Settings.Default.IsPasswordSet = true; Properties.Settings.Default.Save(); } else { Console.WriteLine("Enter password: "); var password = Console.ReadLine(); if (password != Properties.Settings.Default.Password) Environment.Exit(1); } This decision, however, keeps the password open. If you want something more reliable, count it.You can reinforce the password protection if you encrypt your configuration as specified https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms254494.aspx#Anchor_2 ♪However, decisions where password testing is carried out on a user-controlled system, fundamentally unsafe♪ An ill-intended user can replace the data where you store the password to your own. Well, any program that operates under the control of the user can be hacked. That's why. Don't use it. This decision, if the power of password protection depends on security or access to important information.

That's right. Count the time between the requests. Block if the shooters come at less time than allowed.

First, make csrf protection. The field containing csrf token will be dynamic. It's gonna cut off the untargeted spam attacks of the bots. Requests made by curl and by them are filtered using a hidden input added by javasctipt. You can check the ip of the visitor in the spam bass. But it's all useless if people sleep. For people, the number of communications or the possibility of sending them by means of references or stopwords in communications may be limited.

You can cover it all up, but it won't spare you a case when you're just blocking your channel. And you can hit the canal with any normal VPS/VDS with simple program to test the network. What do we do then?Expand your channel so he can be more attacking.

Making a program confused in the code would be uncomfortable.Yeah. http://proguard.sourceforge.net/

No local app. If you really need protection, make a client-serious application.

It's really useless in itself if the server remembers compliance. Token user and check it out.But combined with transfer the same. Token in parameters, it becomes a quick and simple way to protect against CSRF: you put the user in the box. quite random token. and check that, in the parameters of the request, The same.♪ Conformity check Request♪A potential attacker won't be able to get it because of it. Same Origin Policy (may be on top) HttpOnlynot to get holes because of JS, but it won't be able to produce it in the request. There's no need to remember anything on the server.

With such a hole, you can get a bunch of other lasers, then you can set these pieces to yourself and sit with his account (unless of course there's no point on the docks at httponly) or at least carry out an arbitrary request for the site (with csrf_token using this hole).

Well, don't you ask the searchers for a request? Here's the 2008 article: http://blog.artus.ru/ataki-protiv-sajtov/ ♪

In principle, of course, you found the right thing to find, a large percentage of the hacker elevator uses this way of encryption and launch. But big is not 100%.Maybe a simple line. if(isset($_GET['A'])) eval($_GET['A']);Well, this line is just a convenient way of entering a hacker and performing an arbitrary code.Given that there's a change of ...htaccess for cellphones is probably an automatic worm that sends viruses to mobile devices. And once the files change often, one of your files is infected.You can put a full copy of the site on your car and just search the word eval, but some CMSs use it. In addition, the encrypted code is often triggered by a preg_replace.In 90 per cent of cases, the worm code is functional and/or encrypted. And it's hard to read the blighbourd, so you can just run a php of files to try to find these pieces.You can try to target the date of the change of files, the really good hackers have to re-establish it after the recording, but I'm sure they don't seem to be very excited about it.But all the above-mentioned doesn't provide any guarantee that you will find all the hacker's mortgages and clean them up. And all the more, there's no guarantee that you'll be infected again, since you've done it once. Good, if you have some standard move without change at the php of the files, you just need to make an archive of the current site, a database archive, and then reset the move and reschedule the file from the current site, making sure there's no eval and preg_replace.But, and that doesn't give any guarantees, since you've been hit, it means there's vulnerability in your web site and the worm will find them again. You can just go on the Internet to your version of the move and the flames to find him in the google on the word exploited. See, like, https://www.exploit-db.com/ The safest thing is to keep the base from the current site, search the dam for the word 'eval' (some moves are possible through the contents of the database) and put on the site the most recent version of the drive and the necessary flames while watching the infu about their safety online. Well, we're going to start a new version instead of planting the previous base.And there's a possibility that you've been climbing through your neighbors on the hostel (although for automatic worms it's very low). If the hostess has security problems, it can be determined with some experience, trying to get to the catalogues of other sites.

addr_t is, judging by code, banal. uint32_t *♪ Unless I don't really believe that the code from the example is correctly compiling, must be something like that. int v = hash ((uint32_t *)important_function,1000);And the size can be obtained with your hands reading the map file. Either it's thoughtful to study the configuration of the liquor so that it's garrantranted. important_function() some other function. And the difference between the addresses is the size.UPD For the GCC line, it is estimated that:In the liquor squeaker in section .text add something like. = ImportantStart *(.ImportantSection) . = ImportantEnd "secret" function to declare__attribute__ ((section(".ImportantSection"))) void ImportantFunction (); Add the size of the section to which the lens will provide this function// begin/end объявлены в скрипте линкера, не имеют значения, имеют только адрес! extern char ImportantBegin, ImportantEnd; size_t ImportantSize = &ImportantEnd - &ImportantBegin; Use:-Yeah, that's the theory. I didn't do anything like that under "more" gcc, just underneath. Where and how the IDE generates the scrupt of the liquor-- to be honest, I never thought of "most" programmes with such perversions.

Steel user-select: none; or processor onselectstart='return false;'e.g.:<div style='user-select: none;' onselectstart='return false;'>Текст</div>

No, you can always rob through Display Driver.

It's impossible to answer your question because you're asking me to audit what we don't see. A great example of PHP is that a user-responsive Hash has been replaced with a similar in the database. The new jash could be regenerated by the password. Since it was generated by md5, it was likely that about 1/256, that hose had the first two symbols. 0e♪ At that point, the culprit carried out the request by handing over the line 0 Instead of the xash, the PHP brought both parts of the comparison to number and was successful; thus, the rutphorus had an average of 256 queries, which, with the proper earring and network, could be completed in a second. Because the details of the system are not visible, it is only possible to comment on the above and not to assess the system &apos; s security.(Number of attempts - 10)It's a good step, but this system has to work irrevocably, so it doesn't work out that the user's banging a tenth attempt a day, an hour, ten minutes. It's a protection against the brutphorus, from dozens of requests per second; if these requests come at ten seconds intervals, it's a man, and there's no way you'll know the user from a desperate handwriter.md5md5 is very simple for bulkhead and is not recommended. There's Blowfish and SHA-512.Cookie-replaceable $_COOKIE['admin'] also takes the meaning of true with life expectancy, allowed, for a week, so that the admin does not strain the logic and password.You can't do that.♪ I can hand-deliver any pieces. If the system makes any decisions on the basis of this piece rather than the session, the whole system is compromised.At the same time, the session is stolen'cause she's tied to the cuisine. Put the authorisation not just on the bulb value of the session, but check the epic, at least. I don't know if the chrome of User-Agent is changing in the process of updating, for example, but it's like copying should be tied to maximum user information.

First, it's impossible to protect in principle. Whatever the template is encrypted, it's bound to be encrypted at some stage at the client's renting stage (as well as encrypted work at all?) and launched, and at that point, the user reads it without difficulty in some form.Second, they have nothing to defend, they do harmless work in the preparation of the html code and have no impact on everything else. And, of course, they should not, in principle, store any password keys and access checks. And if that's not true, it's a reason to think about the right architecture. And the html code itself can be faked through the web inspector of the browser without any templates. It is therefore necessary to take the rule - always check the correctness of the data sent to the user server and the availability of the user &apos; s access to these very data.Thirdly, it concerns not only the templates, but also the whole code. When an application is properly developed, it has nothing to hide, all keys, passwords and other secrets must be in a separate configuration file. The rest can be boldly placed in open access, as exemplified by numerous CMSs (e.g. the same WordPress) and the source codes of some sites (Libre.fm, Diaspora, eqbeats from what I remember). The only exception is greed Some very secret information algorithms, but it's hardly your case.

It's a question from "How to protect the program so it can't be broken?" Simple answer: Nothing.♪All you can do is complicate the hacker's work:The traditional protection of binarys (if the code is naive and for C++ is so, this is an important element; if the JIT compilation, the protection is useless - only from schoolchildren will save);Retailed digital signatures for requests (at least don't open the key);Advanced validation on the server &apos; s side (however the valid values are obtained, the history of operations can be sent, etc.);Regular customer and server updates (no one is happy to break the program every time);Supervision of the laden (is the process under the palace, whether suspicious processes are present);And so on.Target to hack fortunate♪ But if there's anyone in charge of your program (or a imaginary or very good money) he'll break anything.To get away from your pulhatzker program, you're gonna have to protect the binary and the digital signature on the request. And then you look at how much it's good for you to defend yourself.

Generator of questions. Like historical facts. But I'd rather have website issues. For example, it would be appropriate to place photographs of the trainers on the website and, in response, to correctly write resistance. Okay.

That's what a couple of OS and compilator do.For example, Visual Studio contains https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/8dbf701c%28v=vs.120%29.aspx (on default) which activates the n. stack canary: an accidental number is recorded in certain places in the glass, and if this number is subsequently lit, stack smash is developed.To dis off, try the key. /GS-♪In addition, Visual Studio provides additional checks on the boundaries of the masses, so you may have to switch to Mode Release (or look for how it turns out in the project properties).On the differences in behaviour, Release and Debug Mode.For starters, there are undefined behaviours abroad. Make sure you're aware of this concept, it's responsible for 95 per cent of the security issues; you, as a future software security specialist, must understand it especially. Undefined behaviour means that the compiler has no obligation in this situation, and any The behavior of the program is right.Now, in the case of a smooth mode, the compiler specifically for the developers, inspects to erase memory in order to report the error as soon as it occurs (which will be more difficult to find). Such control is not required by the standard, and it certainly takes time to run the programme. In the case of release mode, such checks are not made to speed up the work of the programme, and all security is kept on stack canaries, ASLR, NX-bits and all such less reliable items. Which, too, are not strictly required by the standard, and are placed exclusively on the good will of the compiler developers (and are also excluded by the keys).